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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue equity in 
local outcomes.  Using state education finance as an object of analysis, we develop a theoretical 
model that emphasizes the social welfare implications of equity versus allocative efficiency and 
distributive politics.  We then hypothesize that the relative liberalism of a state’s citizens and 
institutions should affect the weight attached to equity in the social welfare function, as well as the 
ability of the courts to alter those weights.  Using a panel design, we explain state funding allocations 
to 8,048 local school districts from 1992 through 1996.  The statistical results show that the relative 
emphasis on equity differs substantially across states based on political values.  States with 
conservative citizens and institutions place less emphasis on revenue equity than states with liberal 
citizens and institutions.  Judicial mandates are generally unsuccessful in producing more equal 
allocations, but are more successful when accompanied by receptive citizens and institutions.  The 
larger implication is that responsiveness to political values is a major determinant of state propensity 
toward equalizing outcomes across local jurisdictions. 
 
 
POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS AND EQUITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCE 
Equity is a core value of democracy and widely studied in American politics.  In this study we 
explore the general question of how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue 
equity in local outcomes?  Within the American states substantial funding inequities exist across local 
school districts, and many argue that this results in disparate treatment of taxpayers, as well as 
differences in the quality of education.  Thus, we use public education finance as an object of analysis 
to address the more general question.   
Public education finance is decentralized in most states with heavy reliance on local revenues.  
Local taxing authorities differ in their ability and willingness to raise revenues for education.  Wealthy 
districts can raise greater revenues and provide a richer educational experience for their students.  Poor 
districts often have lower revenues, even with higher tax effort, resulting in crumbling infrastructures, 
underpaid teachers, and an inability to educate students with special needs.   
In the interest of greater equity, all states supplement local funding through general revenues to 
“level-out” per pupil revenues.  However, states are also often limited in their willingness to equalize 
funding across local districts, perhaps due to political considerations.  For example, in 1996 total 
revenues per pupil across states ranged from $4,946 in Utah to $9,907 in New Jersey.  Within Utah, 
revenues per pupil ranged from about $3,850 to $7,770, while in New Jersey they ranged from about 
$6,430 to $15,260.  The Congressional Research Service has noted that disparities within states are 
often three to one from lowest to highest revenue districts (Riddle 1990).  These revenue inequities 
result from allocation decisions by local taxing authorities and state education finance institutions 
acting together to produce a total funding package for each school district.   
As a result of these inequities, there have been numerous court challenges to state allocation 
schemes.  Citizen lawsuits alleging taxpayer inequity have been filed in 43 states since the landmark 
Serrano decision in 1971.  As of 2001, the Supreme Courts of 17 states had overturned their systems for 
educational finance, but the courts had upheld the systems in another 20 states.  Litigation continues in 
the remaining states, as well as in many of the states where courts have already ruled.  For example, in 
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New Jersey there have been seven different versions of the Robinson decision, and in California three 
separate decisions from the Serrano case.  Thus, the politics of education finance involves the nuance 
that courts often attempt to compel state democratic institutions to produce greater revenue equity 
across local school districts.   
In this study we explore how politics affects the relative emphasis by states on achieving equity in 
public education.  More specifically, we ask the following questions.  To what extent do state 
democratic institutions emphasize equity versus efficiency and distributive politics in their funding 
allocations to local school districts?  Does the relative liberalism of a state’s citizens and institutions 
affect the emphasis by states on achieving revenue equity?  How successful are the courts in 
compelling states to place greater emphasis on revenue equity?  Does the relative liberalism of a state’s 
citizens and institutions affect the ability of courts to compel greater revenue equity? 
In addressing these questions we apply a social welfare theory of state allocations.  This is followed 
by a discussion of data, variables, and a research design for evaluating the theoretical framework.  We 
then report statistical results showing that states differ systematically in their emphasis on equity as a 
function of citizen liberalism, institutional liberalism, and judicial mandates.  We also show that courts 
are most effective in compelling states to reallocate based on equity when the citizens and institutions 
of the state are receptive.  We conclude with a discussion of the implications for democratic theory and 
the prospects for meaningful education finance reform.   
A SOCIAL WELFARE INTERPRETATION OF STATE REVENUE ALLOCATIONS 
In making funding allocations to local governments we can think of state education finance 
institutions as a central authority optimizing a social welfare function containing weighted values of 
equity, efficiency, and distributive politics.1  The state legislature is usually the dominant actor in these 
                                                     
1 We use the social welfare function analogy merely as an organizing framework for theoretical discussion and later 
hypotheses testing.  However, we could easily formalize this approach with state central decision makers optimizing total state 
welfare by allocating between school districts on the basis of equity, efficiency, and politics.  For an example of this approach 
see Scholz and Wood (1999).  See also Nicholson (1998: 761-63) for a formal but quite intuitive discussion.       
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decisions.  Revenue allocations are based on a formula developed and approved by the state 
legislature, but with assistance from the state education agency.  The basis for state formulas varies 
widely, but usually considers such factors as local revenue, local tax capacity, economies of scale, as 
well as other special needs (Swanson and King 1997: 226-49).  While state allocations are usually 
formula based, the political nature of developing and approving the formulas leaves substantial leeway 
for allocation systems to respond to each of these values.     
Equity 
State decision-makers could assign all the weight in the social welfare function to equity, by 
“leveling-out” revenues across districts in an absolute sense.  However, this absolutist approach would 
ignore the classic moral hazard problem associated with state revenue equalization efforts.  If local 
school districts recognize that state revenues are forthcoming up to the point of equalization, then 
there is no incentive for local taxing authorities to tax their own residents.  Therefore, full equalization 
is never guaranteed, and the state allocation formula always depends on both local revenue effort and 
the tax capacity of the local district.   
Tax capacity is the ability of citizens of the district to pay for education.  Gold, Smith, and Lawton 
(1995: 27) report that twenty-four states use assessed property valuation in evaluating tax capacity.  
Nine additional states consider property valuation along with a range of other revenue sources such as 
user fees, investments, and bonds.  An additional fourteen states consider property valuation and 
personal income in measuring tax capacity.  The formulas whereby local revenues combine with tax 
capacity to determine the rate of revenue equalization vary widely.2   
Another reason why absolute equalization might not be an appropriate standard is that it would 
ignore the special circumstances that differentiate local districts.  For example, rural districts have 
higher transportation costs and often suffer diseconomies of scale from smaller student populations.  
                                                     
2 Swanson and King (1997: 191-225) provide a categorization of states based on general characteristics of their revenue 
equalization systems. 
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An argument can be made that absolute equalization would penalize rural districts by not allowing for 
these differences.  On the other hand, urban taxpayers have higher total tax bills due to higher service 
levels and a larger number of taxing authorities.  An argument can be made that urban districts should 
therefore receive more state funding to compensate taxpayers for these disadvantages.  There are also 
wide variations in the number of “special need” students across districts.  Absolute revenue 
equalization ignores the higher costs of educating gifted, disabled, or disadvantaged students, thereby 
penalizing other students within a district.  Thus, absolute revenue equalization would not actually 
bring parity of inputs.   
In designing the revenue allocation system, state decision makers also face political constraints.  A 
decision to emphasize equity over other values is itself an inherently political decision that should 
depend on core value and belief systems.  The relative weight attached to equity by state education 
finance institutions should, therefore, respond democratically to the relative liberalism of a state’s 
citizens and institutions (e.g., see Wong 1999).  Intuitively, we would expect conservative citizens and 
institutions to place less emphasis on achieving equity relative to other values, while liberal citizens and 
institutions should prefer greater equity.  Also, decentralized solutions are generally associated with 
conservative political cultures, which are also generally averse to central control.  Conversely, 
centralized financing by the state removes control from local school districts, a result that is more 
consistent with liberal political cultures.3  Therefore, we should expect variations in the relative weights 
attached to equity based on democratic responsiveness to citizens and cultural distinctions.   
Efficiency 
State education finance institutions may also consider the positive externalities associated with 
education in their allocation decisions.  An externality occurs whenever the activities of one economic 
                                                     
3 We have anecdotal evidence of this effect from the struggle for school reform in New Jersey.  When Democrats in New 
Jersey attempted to implement a court ordered finance reform measure based on achieving greater equity, Republicans 
responded by threatening to remove the clause in their state constitution from which the court order derived (Firestone et al 
1997).  The central concern for Republicans was that equalization required higher taxes and that local districts would lose 
control over their schools due to the proposed reforms. 
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agent affect the activities of another economic agent in ways that are not reflected in normal 
transactions (Nicholson 1998: 730).  In this study the two economic agents are the local taxing 
authority and the state. In other words, a higher gain to society results if state allocation decisions take 
into account potential gains beyond the benefit to the local school district’s residents.  Reallocation 
based on positive externalities is generally recognized to result in greater allocative efficiency.  
Allocative efficiency means arranging inputs so as to produce the greatest gains for society (Nicholson 
1998: 732-733).4 
The state produces the greatest allocative efficiency by redistributing funds toward districts with 
higher marginal returns.  Generally, educated workers have higher long-term earnings potential, and 
also provide a more attractive environment for business investment.  By subsidizing local education 
the state gains the long-term benefits of a stronger economy and higher tax revenues.  Since the 
potential for improvement is greater in districts with less well-educated citizens, the state should target 
these districts to produce higher marginal returns.   
Additionally, an educated workforce is important to minimizing such problems as illiteracy, 
unemployment, poverty, and crime.  Therefore, the state will spend less future money on 
unemployment compensation, welfare payments, law enforcement, prisons, and other effects related to 
low education.  Accordingly, states should also target districts with high unemployment and poverty to 
maximize marginal gains and minimize future payments for these problems.   
Allocational efficiency is a concept that is theoretically distinct from equity and distributive 
politics.  If an allocation produces higher marginal gains for the state, relative to other possible 
allocations, then it should be considered allocationally efficient.  Of course, illiteracy, unemployment, 
                                                     
4 There are at least two conceptualizations of efficiency that have been applied in economics (e.g., see Downs and Larkey 
1986: 6-7).  1) Efficiency is a state in which it is not possible to change that state and have someone become better off with 
no one worse off.  This is sometimes called Pareto efficiency, or with a slight change in definition Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  2) 
Efficiency is arranging inputs so as to produce the greatest outputs.  For example, this could involve arranging labor and 
capital in a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce optimal outputs at the intersection of a production possibility 
frontier and indifference curves.  However, in our case it involves arranging state level inputs across local districts to produce 
the largest gain for the state.  Note that when allocational efficiency exists, the outcome is also Pareto efficient.   
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poverty, and related anomalies are typically higher in the same districts where schools are poorly 
funded.  Therefore, it may be difficult to distinguish between state allocations based on these more 
specific problems versus a thrust for revenue equalization.  Still, we should control for these factors in 
any analysis of state efforts at revenue equalization.  The question then becomes how much weight 
states give to equity, independent of these more specific factors within local school districts?   
Distributive Politics 
States may also reallocate resources between districts based purely on political considerations.  The 
weight given to distributive politics in the social welfare function may be due to a genuine belief by 
decision makers that reallocation is somehow socially beneficial.  For example, a social benefit may 
derive from reallocating toward districts with heavy concentrations of certain racial or ethnic groups.  
However, democratic decision makers need not have such normative rationale, and may allocate 
politically on the basis of self-interest and the reelection incentive (Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina 1977).   
The state politics literature suggests that state decision makers respond to citizen preferences 
across a variety of policy arenas.  For example, Hill and Leighley (1992) found that state welfare 
payments respond to the cultural conservatism of a state’s citizens.  Likewise, Morgan (1994) showed 
that the relative progressiveness of a state’s tax system depends on state liberalism.  Clingermayer and 
Wood (1995) found that state indebtedness responds democratically to the relative liberalism of a 
state’s citizens.  More generally, Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989; see also Wright, Erikson, and 
McIver 1987) found congruence between citizen and government liberalism and state allocations 
across a range of policy areas.  We should also control for political responsiveness to various group 
effects from local school districts as we evaluate the importance of equity in the social welfare 
function. 
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Equity, Politics, and the Courts 
We noted above that revenue inequity has been the basis for challenging the education finance 
systems in 43 states since the landmark Serrano decision in 1971 (Evans, Murray, and Schwab 1997; 
Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998).  The California Supreme Court ruled in Serrano v. Priest that the gap 
in per pupil expenditures in Baldwin Park relative to Beverly Hills was so great that it violated the equal 
protection guarantees of federal and state constitutions.  The court ruled that whatever the cause of 
disparities, in this case a large difference in local revenues, redistribution was necessary to diminish 
variation across districts. 
In subsequent years, several lower federal courts followed California’s lead.  However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in 1973 (Rodriguez v an Antonio Independent School District) that a disparity in per 
pupil expenditures does not violate the U.S. Constitution’s equal protection clause.  This majority 
opinion prevailed even though there was evidence that a poor district was taxing its residents at a 
much higher rate than an affluent district, and still generated less revenue.  The Rodriguez decision 
halted attempts to equalize school funding through the U.S. Constitution.  However, citizen challenges 
to state education finance systems have continued through state courts.  Subsequent successful state 
court cases were largely based on state educational clauses that guaranteed “thorough and efficient” 
education systems.  In particular, litigants were successful when they were able to show that disparities 
in educational funding patterns led to disparities in educational outcomes (Firestone et al. 1997).  Since 
1971 seventeen states have fallen under court order to produce greater revenue equity.5  This is 
generally achieved by mandating a larger state allocation to local school districts. 
The degree to which court ordered reallocations produce greater revenue equity within states is an 
open question.  Murray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) find evidence that some reallocation occurs in the 
years following a court decision.  However, their analysis employs data at five year intervals and fails to 
                                                     
5 The most recent of these involves the state of New York.  On January 10th, 2001 the New York Supreme Court ruled in 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity vs. State of New York that the state legislature must come up with a new education finance system or 
face judicial intervention.   
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control for a variety of factors that could explain intervening changes.6  The judicial politics literature 
strongly questions the extent to which courts can produce social change (Rosenberg 1991).  Canon and 
Johnson (1999) detail various reasons why courts may be unsuccessful in forcing compliance.7  The 
reason most relevant to this study concerns the policy preferences of a state’s citizens and institutions.  
As suggested by Cannon and Johnson (1999: 75), “If the policy preference [of the community] is 
reinforced by a judicial decision, the community is likely to react positively; if a judicial policy runs 
counter to a communities traditional preferences, reactions will be negative.”  Courts can initiate 
change, but must depend on compliance by central allocation authorities to produce change.  Thus, 
this study also explores the effectiveness of courts in altering the relative weight attached by states to 
equity in the social welfare function.   
DATA AND METHODS 
To what extent does politics affect state propensities toward revenue equalization across local 
school districts?  To what extent does politics affect the success of judicial mandates for state revenue 
equalization?  We addressed these questions statistically by evaluating 40,490 revenue allocation 
decisions of the 48 contiguous states from 1992 through 1996.8  The sample included state allocations 
to all 8,098 unified school districts with size of at least 500 students.9  Because the data encompassed 
allocation decisions across five years, we employed a panel data design.   
                                                     
6 They concluded based on descriptive statistics and an econometric model that the courts made a difference.  However, the 
five year time intervals of their data were too coarse to capture the specific timing of court decisions.  Their model was also 
seriously underspecified in that it did not control for pre-existing trends and contained insufficient controls for the various 
other factors that could affect school finance decisions other than the courts.   
7 See Canon and Johnson (1999: chapter 7) for a review of the literature.  
8 We take these five years because this was all of the available data at the time of the study.  We omit Alaska because its 
topography and climate produce a substantial proportion of districts requiring very high revenue.  We omit Hawaii because 
there are no local districts.   
9 We omit very small districts because of the substantial number with extremely high revenues.  In our opinion, these outliers 
could not be explained simply by diseconomies of scale from district size effects.  Therefore, we restricted the sample to 
districts larger than 500.  Note that the sample still includes a large number of rural districts with small student populations 
relative to urban and suburban districts. 
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We merged several large data sets to have the necessary variables for the analysis.  The Public 
Elementary and Secondary School District Finance Data File contains revenues, expenditures, debt, 
and assets for all public elementary and secondary school systems in the United States.  This annual 
data collection is part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual census of governments and is currently 
available only through 1996.   
The Common Core of Data (CCD) is a program of the U.S. Department of Education's National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The NCES annually surveys all public elementary and 
secondary schools, all local education agencies, and all state education agencies throughout the United 
States. The CCD contains three categories of information: general descriptive information on schools 
and school districts, data on students and staff, and fiscal data. The data on students and staff includes 
selected demographic characteristics.   
The School District Data Book (SDDB), developed by the Mesa Group under contract to the 
NCES, is an electronic library consisting of 44 CD-ROMs containing social, economic, and 
administrative data for all public school districts in the United States.  Based on the 1990 population 
census, the SDDB contains variables describing the demographic characteristics of the population of 
each district.  The limitation of the SDDB is that, unlike the other two datasets, it does not change 
over time.  Thus, we use the SDDB data under the assumption that the demographics of the 
population of each school district do not change very rapidly.  We used the NCES school district 
numerical identification code to merge data from these three sources.10   
The dependent variable for our analysis was the dollar amount per pupil of state revenue allocated 
to each local school district during each year.11  This variable was generally increasing through time, 
                                                     
10 The information necessary to replicate our results is available at http://www.xxx.xxx.  The original data set is quite large, 
occupying about 46 Megabytes of disk space in a binary format.  Therefore, we provide the data in a compressed format of 
about 6.36 Megabytes.  Also available are our program setup files, and all variable definitions as they pertain to the original 
data sources. 
11 Note that these numbers do not include the federal allocation to each district.  These comprise a very small proportion of 
the total and are not particularly relevant to the analysis. 
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suggesting temporal differences in mean.  Also, we were concerned about structural disparities 
between states in the degree of dependence on state revenues, as well as differences between systems, 
and other factors that would be unaccounted for by the theoretical model.  For these reasons, we 
estimated the panel using a two-way fixed effect design with group effects for each year and each 
state.12  The two-way fixed effects model normally provides a tough test in that the fixed effects are 
collinear with independent variables diminishing their statistical significance.  However, the large 
sample size means this is unlikely to be much of a problem.   
Understanding states’ emphasis on revenue equalization requires that we control the tax capacity 
of a district.  This is important for telling the central allocation authority the amount of effort the 
district is expending.   Among other things, tax capacity depends on the wealth and income of the 
taxpayers of a district.  Accordingly, we included the 1990 median home value of each district along 
with the 1990 per capita income of each district’s residents, both in thousands of dollars.  As discussed 
above, both variables are used by various states in their allocation formulas, so they should be strongly 
related to the state revenue allocation for each district. 
The equity dimension was represented by own source revenue disparities across local school 
districts in each state and year.13  Controlling for tax capacity, states should allocate more revenues 
                                                     
12 The two way fixed effect model we applied is given , where the subscript i refers to 
the district, the subscript s refers to the state, and the subscript t refers to the year.  In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, 
we imposed the restriction .  This is a variant of the model suggested by Greene (2000: 565).  In testing 
the appropriateness of the two way fixed effect model we performed the statistical tests recommended by Greene (2000: 565-
566).  We also evaluated the appropriateness of the analogous random effects specification using the test recommended by 
Hausman (1978).  The two-way fixed effects specification performed better than all of the alternatives.  However, there was 
very little difference in results between the one and two-way fixed effect models or the fixed versus random effect models.  
Note that our unit of analysis is the district-year, rather than the state-year.  In a typical panel data design we would have 
group effects for each district and year, rather than for each state and year.  However, our interest is in controlling for 
unmodeled differences in decision-making between states rather than between districts.  Note also that since the number of 
districts differs between states, we have an unbalanced panel.  This means that the standard panel corrections for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are inapplicable.  Of course, autocorrelation is less of an issue since we are dummying 
out time.  Heteroscedasticity is also less problematic since revenues are in a per pupil metric. 
itittsity   x'0
0
t
t
i
s 
13 We also considered lagged local revenues, rather than contemporaneous local revenues for this measure.  The results were 
little changed.  We decided against the lagged measure for two reasons: 1) state funding formulae typically rely on current year 
local tax rates, and 2) using the lagged measure threw out data unnecessarily. 
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toward local districts that raise less revenue per pupil relative to the average district within the state.  
We used a centered measure of these revenue disparities to facilitate interpretation of the results.  
Specifically, we included local revenues per pupil minus revenues per pupil for the average district for 
each state and year (in thousands).  This measure gauges how far above or below in thousands of 
dollars each school district is from the state average in revenues.  This measure of revenue distance is 
the key equity measure in our analysis.   
The efficiency dimension was represented by three variables.  The education level for citizens 
within a district holds a key to better long-term economic outcomes, greater tax revenue for the state, 
as well as other social problems.  Thus, we included the percentage of each district’s residents 20 years 
and over that did not complete high school.  To reflect employment conditions within each district, we 
included the percentage of persons over 16 years of age who were unemployed.  The poverty status of 
a district was represented by the percentage of students participating in the free and reduced lunch 
program.  If efficiency is important, then the state should allocate state revenues to improve economic 
and social conditions independent of local revenue or the tax capacity of the district.   
The distributive politics dimension was represented by seven variables that controlled for 
attributes of each district’s residents.  The racial and ethnic composition of each district was measured 
as the percent of a district’s population that was African-American and the percent that was Hispanic.  
These groups often make social demands on the legislature, producing an expectation of larger state 
allocations.  The rural characteristic was gauged by the percent of a district’s children living in rural 
areas (both farm and non-farm).  The urban feature was measured as the percent of a district’s children 
living inside an urbanized area.  As discussed above, both urban and rural districts have special needs 
that strengthen their case for larger state allocations.  Central decision makers may also be more 
responsive to well-educated constituents.  To test for this effect we included the percent of a district’s 
citizens having a college degree or better.  In contrast, we would expect less responsiveness to citizens 
with children in private schools, because they have typically taken the “exit” option for religious or 
 
 12
other reasons.  Thus, we also included a measure for the percent of a district’s children enrolled in 
private school.  Additionally, political reallocation may occur along generational lines.  Younger 
citizens with school age children have stronger need for state allocations, and may therefore make 
stronger demands.  Therefore, we included the percentage of households in each district having 
children 18 years of age and under.  If distributive politics is important to state allocation decisions, 
then we should control for all of these variables in evaluating the importance of revenue equalization.   
THE BASE MODEL 
Table 1 reports statistical results for a base model containing the variables discussed in the 
preceding section.14  This model provides a benchmark for subsequent analyses evaluating the effect of 
politics on the propensity of states to emphasize equity in the social welfare function.  It is useful 
initially to interpret the base model, so that we can focus exclusively on the relation between politics 
and revenue equalization in succeeding sections.   
INSERT TABLE 1  ABOUT HERE 
Over the period of analysis the average school district raised about $2,798 per pupil annually in 
local revenues, and received from the state about $2,834.50 per pupil. The standard deviation in the 
state allocation was about $1,183.17.  Table 1 shows that local revenue inequalities explained a 
substantial proportion of these deviations.  Each $1,000 per pupil that a district fell below a state’s 
local revenue average resulted in about $291 per pupil of additional state money.  The standard 
deviation of the local revenue equity measure was $1,670.  Thus, a district one standard deviation 
below average in local revenues received about $486 per pupil more as a direct result of the local 
revenue shortfall.   
                                                     
14 As shown in Table 1, the base model explains about 60 percent of the variability in state allocations to local school districts.  
However, it is reasonable to ask how much of this is due to the fixed effects vs. the substantive variables.  A model that omits 
the year fixed effects explains about 55 percent of the variance.  A model that omits all fixed effects explains about 29 percent 
of the variance.   
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The controls for tax capacity were also significant, both substantively and statistically.  Each 
decline of $1,000 in per capita income for a district’s residents produced a rise of about $17.09 per 
pupil in the state allocation.  The standard deviation in per capita income across districts was about 
$4,740.  Thus, a district that fell one standard deviation below average in per capita income received 
about $81.01 per pupil more in state money.   
With respect to home valuation, each $1,000 decline in the median district home value produced 
an increase of about $1.92 per pupil in the state allocation.  The standard deviation in home values 
across districts was about $53,190.  Therefore, a district falling a full standard deviation below the 
average received about $102.21 per pupil more in its state allocation.  These results are consistent with 
an understanding that revenue disparities between districts are the primary rationale for state 
allocations, but that adjustments are also made based on income, wealth, and other factors. 
To what extent did a thrust for efficiency affect state allocations?  Controlling for revenue and tax 
capacity, we see strong evidence from Table 1 that central decision makers shifted state revenues 
across districts based on the educational, employment, and poverty attributes of local residents.  With 
regard to education, each one percent increase in a district’s residents lacking a high school diploma 
produced about $13.92 per pupil in additional state money.  On average, about 18.06 percent of all 
district’s residents lacked a high school diploma, with a standard deviation of about 7.25 percent.  
Thus, a district one standard deviation above the average in high school dropouts typically received 
about $100.88 per pupil in additional state money.   
The results for unemployment and poverty are similarly suggestive.  Each one percent increase in 
unemployment within a district produced an increase in state revenues of $53.96 per pupil.  The 
standard deviation in unemployment across districts was about 1.17 percent, so a district one standard 
deviation higher in unemployment received about $63.29 per pupil in additional state money.15  With 
                                                     
15 Intuitively, the average unemployment rate across districts looks a bit low in Table 1.  However, it should be remembered 
that this is an average across school districts, rather than an average across the nation.  In other words, unemployment tends 
to be concentrated in urban districts that are typically quite large, but constitute only a few of the nation’s school districts. 
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respect to poverty, each one percent increase in the number of students on free and reduced 
lunches produced an additional $2.38 per pupil.  Since the standard deviation of free and reduced 
lunch students was about 16.79 percent, this means that a district one standard deviation above the 
average in free and reduced lunch students received about $39.92 per pupil in additional state money.  
These three effects combined suggest that allocative efficiency is an important, but not dominant 
concern of central decision makers. 
Do central decision makers respond to distributive politics in their allocations of state resources?  
In the base model reported in Table 1, we see no evidence of political responsiveness grounded in race 
or ethnicity.  The percent African-American variable is non-significant, and the percent Hispanic 
variable is incorrectly signed.16  On the other hand, all other variables suggest that distributive politics 
may be important in the allocation process. 
The results for the urban and rural variables show that there is a bias in state allocations toward 
both urban and rural districts at the expense of suburban districts.  Each one percent increase in 
relevant children living in urban and rural areas produced respectively about $2.94 and $1.61 per pupil 
in additional state revenues.  Arbitrarily defining an urban district as having 80 percent or more of its 
students living in a highly urbanized area, such a district would receive about $162.54 more per pupil 
than the average district.  This is a fairly substantial effect.  Again, defining a rural district as one having 
80 percent or more of its students living in rural areas, such a district would receive about $39.42 more 
per pupil than an average district.   
Districts with a higher percentage of parents that are college educated received slightly more than 
other districts.  Each one percent increase in residents with a college education resulted in an 
additional $5.30 per pupil.  The average percent college educated across all districts was about 10.46 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
16 The sign on the percent Hispanic variable is actually consistent with earlier research showing that Hispanics are often 
under-represented in the political process.  See for example Meier (1991).  
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with a standard deviation of 7.15.  Thus, a district one standard deviation above the average in 
citizens with a college education received about $37.90 more per pupil in state funding.   
Districts with a higher proportion of children in private schools received slightly less than other 
districts.  Each one percent increase in the proportion of a district’s relevant children in private schools 
resulted in a decline of about $4.11 in the state allocation.  On average across districts about 7.3 
percent of relevant children attended private schools with a standard deviation of about 6.1 percent.  
This means that a district one standard deviation above average in private school enrollment received 
about $25.07 less in state funding.  This is not a large differential, but does suggest that taking the 
“exit” option results in weaker state level representation and negative effects for the residents who 
remain.   
We also found evidence of a generational effect in state allocations.  As the percent of households 
in a local district with children under 18 years of age increased, the state allocation per pupil increased.  
Each one percent increase produced about $4.87 per pupil in additional state money.  On average 
across all districts, about 38.82 percent of households had school age children, with a standard 
deviation of 6.98 percent.  A district that was one standard deviation above the average received about 
$34.03 in additional state money.  
In summary, the base model in Table 1 suggests that state decision makers across the U.S. 
integrate the three values of equity, efficiency, and distributive politics into their revenue allocation 
decisions.  Revenue equalization is by far the most important value affecting state allocations.  
However, independent of revenue equalization efforts, central decision makers also take into account 
the efficiency implications of their decisions, as well as distributive politics.  While some of these 
variables operate mostly at the margins, their combined effect suggests that efficiency and politics play 
relatively important roles.  
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THE EFFECT OF POLITICS ON STATE REVENUE EQUALIZATION 
Does politics affect the state propensity toward revenue equalization across local school districts 
within states? We evaluated this question by interacting the local revenue equity variable from the base 
model in the preceding section with the dynamic measures of citizen ideology and institutional 
liberalism developed by Berry et al. (1998).  Their measure of citizen ideology estimates an average 
citizen ideology score for each state and year using the actual ideology of U.S. House of Representative 
incumbents (gauged by their congressional roll call voting scores) and an estimated ideology score for 
election challengers.  Both incumbent and challenger ideologies are weighted by the support they 
received in the general election.  State citizen ideology is assumed to be the average ideology of the 
electorate reflected through all House elections.   
The Berry et al. measure of institutional liberalism aggregates the estimated ideology of the two 
chambers of the state legislature and the governor into a single measure.  The legislative components 
are weighted by the proportional control of the two parties.  For convenience of interpretation, we 
rescaled both measures to run between 0 as most conservative and 100 as most liberal.17 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Column one of Table 2 reports the results for citizen ideology.  The coefficient for local revenue 
equity now represents the revenue equalization effort of the state with the most conservative citizens.  
The interaction coefficient tracks variations in equalization efforts as a function of the ideology of a 
state’s citizens.  The results in the third row of Table 2 show that states with more liberal citizens 
emphasized revenue equity substantially more.  In the most conservative state, each $1,000 that a 
district fell below the state average in local revenues produced about $103.01 in additional state money.  
                                                     
17 We also considered adjusting the measure for temporal instability using the Groseclose et al. procedure.  However, we 
decided against this adjustment for two reasons.  First, the degree of temporal instability that could occur is limited, because 
we only use five years of the Berry et al. measure.  Second, the Groseclose et al. adjustment is typically applied to raw ADA 
scores, but the Berry et al. measure is already adjusted along other dimensions.  Therefore, it is unclear that the Groseclose et 
al. adjustment is appropriate.  We thank William D. Berry for providing an updated version of the measure. 
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In the most liberal state, however, each $1,000 that a district fell below the state average in local 
revenues produced $468.01 in additional state money.  In other words, controlling for other factors the 
estimated revenue equalization effort of the most liberal state (Vermont) was about 4.54 times (i.e., 
4.54
$103.01
100*$3.65$103.01

 ) the revenue equalization effort of the most conservative state (Oklahoma).   
Column 2 of Table 2 replicates this result by showing how revenue equalization varied with the 
liberalism of a state’s political institutions.  While the relationship is less striking, the third row in 
column 2 shows that controlling for other factors, the state with the most liberal political institutions 
(Maryland) allocated about 26 percent more (i.e., 1.26
$259.33
100*$0.67$259.33

 ) on the basis of local revenue 
inequity than the state with the most conservative political institutions (Montana).   
These results unequivocally show that politics is an important determinant of the relative weight 
attached by states to equity in the social welfare function.  Controlling for all other factors, states with 
conservative citizens and institutions are less responsive to revenue inequities.  In contrast, states with 
liberal citizens and institutions are more responsive to revenue inequities across local school districts. 
POLITICS, JUDICIAL MANDATES, AND REVENUE EQUALIZATION 
How effective are the courts in mandating reallocation of state revenues based on local revenue 
inequity?  To address this question we created an indicator variable for all states and years where 
education finance systems fell under a judicial mandate.18  We interacted this variable with the local 
revenue equity variable from the base equation.   
The results from this analysis, reported in the second row of column 1 of Table 3, show that on 
average the overall allocation to local districts in states under judicial mandate was larger by about 
                                                     
18 The states under judicial mandate were Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  These states 
were under judicial mandate for the entire period of our analysis except for Alabama (1993), Arizona (1994), Massachusetts 
(1993), and Tennessee (1993), which fell under court order during the years in parentheses. 
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$87.18 per pupil.  The equalization coefficient for states under judicial mandate, while statistically 
significant, was not markedly different from that of other states.  In non-mandate states each $1,000 
that a local district fell below the local revenue average resulted in about $280.30 per pupil in state 
money.  In judicial mandate states, an additional $23.18 per pupil was supplied.  These results suggest 
that on average courts are not very effective in altering state’s propensities toward achieving revenue 
equity across local school districts.  The average judicial effect was to modestly increase overall 
spending across all districts, but little change resulted from judicial mandates due to revenue disparities. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
However, Canon and Johnson (1999) suggest that the ability of courts to enforce change depends 
on the preferences of the community.  In issuing a judicial mandate the courts are implicitly trying to 
impose a different social welfare function on democratic decision makers.  If successful, then we 
would expect greater revenue equity across local school districts.  On the other hand, citizen and 
institutional liberalism may hinder or help the courts in producing change.  Specifically, we would 
expect conservative citizens and institutions to be less receptive toward judicial mandates for revenue 
equalization. 
We explored whether citizen ideology and institutional liberalism affected the courts’ ability to 
produce greater revenue equity by creating a three-way interaction between local revenue equity, 
judicial mandates, and citizen ideology or institutional liberalism.  The sixth row of columns two and 
three of Table 3 report the relevant coefficient estimates.  The results show that stronger citizen 
liberalism interacts with the courts to produce greater revenue equity.  However, interpretation of 
these three-way interaction effects is made easier by graphing the response of local revenue equity 
coefficients to changes in liberalism.   
Based on the results in Table 3, the graph on the left side of Figure 1 plots the differential effect of 
citizen liberalism on the revenue equalization coefficients for both judicial mandate and non-judicial 
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mandate states.  We restrict the plots to the actual range of citizen liberalism for both mandate and 
non-judicial mandate states.  For non-judicial mandate states, each $1,000 that a district fell below the 
state local revenue average resulted in an additional $131.58 for the most conservative political culture.  
As citizens became more liberal revenue equity increased, with the most liberal state providing $409.52 
for each $1,000 in revenue shortfall.  This is a difference in non-judicial mandate states of $277.94 
from the most conservative to the most liberal state.   
INSERT FIGURE 1  ABOUT HERE 
For those states under judicial mandate, the most conservative state directed about $180.00 toward 
those districts raising the least in local revenues for each $1,000 local revenue shortfall.   An 
increasingly liberal system increased the effectiveness of judicial mandates.  The most liberal state 
under judicial mandate directed about $703.13 for each $1,000 local revenue shortfall.  This is a 
difference of $523.13 from the most conservative to the most liberal state.  The different slopes of the 
two lines in Figure 1 show that courts were much more effective in forcing revenue equity in states 
having receptive political cultures.  In the most conservative states, judicial mandates produced slightly larger 
reallocations across local school districts.  In the most liberal states, judicial mandates produced reallocations that were 
about twice as large as those occurring in non-judicial mandate states controlling for all other factors.   
The graph on the right side of Figure 1 confirms this differential effect using the institutional 
liberalism measure.  In non-judicial mandate states, the state with the most conservative political 
institutions directed about $252.53 toward districts falling $1,000 below the local revenue average.  As 
institutions became more liberal, revenue equity increased so that the most liberal state allocated about 
$308.27 toward similar districts.  In judicial mandate states, the state with the most conservative 
political institutions allocated about $237.16 to districts falling $1,000 below the local revenue average.  
As above, revenue equity increased with more liberal political institutions to reach $377.98 per $1,000 
local revenue shortfall for the state with the most liberal institutions.  Thus, in the most conservative states, 
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judicial mandates produced no reallocations across local school districts.  In states with the most liberal institutions, 
judicial mandates produced reallocations that were about 1.25 times as large as those occurring in non-judicial mandate 
states controlling for all other factors.   
Thus, citizen ideology and institutional liberalism affected not only the relative weighting of equity 
in each state’s social welfare function, but also the ability of courts to force change.  The evidence in 
Table 3 and Figure 1 shows that courts were generally unsuccessful where the citizens and institutions 
were strongly conservative and averse to revenue equalization.  However, they were more successful as 
the political environment for change was more receptive.  
CONCLUSIONS 
State education finance institutions respond to diverse groups and integrate multiple values in 
allocating resources across local school districts.  As democratic decision makers, state-level 
representatives balance concerns for revenue equity against the need for greater allocative efficiency 
and distributive politics.  State decision makers care about efficient allocations because education 
affects a plethora of other outcomes, including the economy, tax revenues, illiteracy, poverty, and 
crime.  These effects have long-term potential electoral consequences, as do the various influences 
reflecting distributive politics.  State decision makers place the largest weight in the social welfare 
function on increasing revenue equity.  Nevertheless, as we discussed in the introduction, serious 
inequities remain in resource allocations to local school districts within states and across the nation.   
These inequities exist in large part because of the overarching importance of politics to state 
education finance decisions.  Our analysis shows that politics matters a great deal in explaining the 
relative emphasis on revenue equity by state decision makers.  States with conservative citizens and 
institutions use funding schemes that place less emphasis on revenue equalization.  This obviously 
implies more disparate educational opportunities within these states, since education quality is tied to 
the level of funding for local districts.  States with liberal citizens and institutions place greater 
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emphasis on equity by sending a larger proportion of state revenue to districts with weak local tax 
collections and revenue bases.   
Politics also matters in the ability of courts to change the relative weight attached by state decision 
makers to equity.  On average, courts are not very effective in altering state revenue allocations toward 
greater equity.  The typical judicial effect was to raise the overall level of school funding, but the 
average reallocation due to court mandates was very small.  The ability of courts to force change was 
greater, however, when facing citizens and institutions that are receptive to change.  In states with 
strongly conservative citizens and institutions, judicial mandates were relatively unsuccessful in 
diverting more state revenues to disadvantaged local school districts.  In the most conservative states 
there was no difference between allocations for states under judicial mandate relative to those not 
under judicial mandate.  However, in states with the most liberal citizens and judicial mandates, about 
twice as much reallocation occurred relative to states with liberal citizens and no judicial mandate, and 
about five times as much occurred relative to states with the most conservative citizens and no judicial 
mandate. 
The preceding analysis makes clear that state allocation systems respond democratically to the 
relative liberalism of citizens and institutions.  The irony is that this democratic responsiveness 
produces large inequities within and across states, an outcome largely inconsistent with democratic 
values.  Decentralized revenue collection with supplemental allocations from the state results in 
institutions that are likely to remain responsive to these same forces in the future.  The ability of the 
courts to mandate change is constrained by the same influences that produce unequal allocations in the 
first place.  In the words of Alexander Hamilton, courts lack control of either the “sword or the 
purse”, and are limited in their ability to affect significant social change.  Thus, authorities seeking 
greater equity in local outcomes are unlikely to be successful without significant institutional reform at 
the state and local levels.  
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TABLE 1: Base Model of How Equity, Efficiency, and Politics Affect State Revenue 
Allocations to Local School Districts 
Variable 
Slope 
Coefficient 
Mean/ 
Standard Deviation 
Local Revenue Equity (distance from 
average district within state in thousands) 
-291.28 
(-100.27) 
0.00 
[1.67] 
Per Capita Income -17.09 
(-8.56) 
12.79 
[4.74] 
Median Home Valuation -1.92 
(-12.82) 
70.91 
[53.19] 
% High School Dropouts 13.92 
(14.18) 
18.06 
[7.25] 
% Unemployment 53.96 
(12.87) 
2.96 
[1.17] 
% On Free and Reduced Lunch 2.38 
(7.44) 
23.73 
[16.79] 
% African-American 0.28 
(0.98) 
7.45 
[17.16] 
% Hispanic  -2.77 
(-9.87) 
4.89 
[21.92] 
% Urban   2.94 
(19.20) 
24.74 
[40.33] 
% Rural 1.61 
(11.88) 
55.58 
[39.55] 
% College Educated 5.30 
(4.14) 
10.46 
[7.15] 
% In Private Schools -4.11 
(-12.99) 
7.30 
[6.10] 
% With School Age Children 4.87 
(14.95) 
38.83 
[6.98] 
Constant  2355.80 
(64.08) 
 
  
N = 40,490 R2=0.60 
 e=750.64 
Note: The dependent variable is the state allocation to local school districts in each year.  The mean of the dependent 
variable is $2,834.50 with standard deviation $1,183.17.  The model employed a two-way fixed effect design with group 
effects for each state and each year.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  The numbers in brackets are standard 
deviations. 
 
  
TABLE 2: The Effect of Citizen Ideology and Institutional Liberalism on State Revenue 
Allocations to Local School Districts 
Variable 
Citizen 
Liberalism 
Institutional 
Liberalism 
Local Revenue Equity (distance from average district 
within state in thousands) 
-103.01 
(-14.05) 
-259.33 
(-46.71) 
Citizen/Institutional Liberalism -14.32 
(-14.81) 
0.30 
(0.76) 
Local Revenue Equity *Citizen/Institutional 
Liberalism 
-3.65 
(-27.92) 
-0.67 
(-6.75) 
Per Capita Income  -10.68 
(-5.38) 
-16.48 
(-8.26) 
Median Home Valuation -0.80 
(-5.20) 
-1.76 
(-11.63) 
% High School Dropouts 18.06 
(18.41) 
14.11 
(14.37) 
% Unemployment 56.54 
(13.65) 
55.20 
(13.16) 
% On Free and Reduced Lunch 2.26 
(7.17) 
2.38 
(7.46) 
% African-American 0.39 
(1.42) 
0.30 
(1.07) 
% Hispanic  -2.72 
(-9.80) 
-2.79 
(-9.94) 
% Urban   2.97 
(19.60) 
2.93 
(19.14) 
% Rural 1.64 
(12.23) 
1.61 
(11.85) 
% College Educated 5.19 
(4.09) 
4.96 
(3.87) 
% In Private Schools -4.25 
(-13.60) 
-4.10 
(-12.97) 
% With School Age Children 3.82 
(11.78) 
4.71 
(14.41) 
Constant  2897.05 
(46.39) 
2325.11 
(55.82) 
 
N=40,490 R2=0.61 R2=0.60 
Note: The dependent variable is the state allocation to local school districts in each year.  The model employed a two-way 
fixed effect design with group effects for each state and each year.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
 
  
TABLE 3: The Effect of Citizen Ideology and Institutional Liberalism on Judicial Mandates 
for State Revenue Equity 
Variable Courts 
Citizen 
Liberalism 
Institutional 
Liberalism 
Local Revenue Equity (distance from 
average district within state in thousands) 
-280.30 
(-75.82) 
-131.58 
(-10.44) 
-252.52 
(-36.07) 
Court 87.18 
(2.85) 
90.53 
(3.03) 
86.15 
(2.82) 
Local Revenue Equity*Court -23.18 
(-4.80) 
191.62 
(11.68) 
15.37 
(1.25) 
Citizen/Institutional Liberalism  -14.32 
(-14.97) 
0.23 
(0.59) 
Local Revenue Equity *Citizen/ 
Institutional Liberalism 
 -2.78 
(-14.51) 
-0.56 
(-4.89) 
Local Revenue Equity* Citizen/ 
Institutional Liberalism*Court 
 -5.80 
(-19.79) 
-0.96 
(-3.95) 
Per Capita Income  -17.61 
(-8.81) 
-9.84 
(-5.01) 
-17.09 
(-8.56) 
Median Home Valuation -2.02 
(-13.36) 
-0.94 
(-6.20) 
-1.89 
(-12.41) 
% High School Dropouts 13.44 
(13.62) 
17.31 
(17.81) 
13.49 
(13.69) 
% Unemployment 54.08 
(12.91) 
56.38 
(13.75) 
54.85 
(13.08) 
% On Free and Reduced Lunch 2.46 
(7.68) 
2.57 
(8.22) 
2.49 
(7.78) 
% African-American 0.25 
(0.90) 
0.26 
(0.93) 
0.29 
(.03) 
% Hispanic  -2.84 
(-10.10) 
-2.95 
(-10.73) 
-2.89 
(-10.32) 
% Urban   2.91 
(18.94) 
2.79 
(18.59) 
2.89 
(18.83) 
% Rural 1.65 
(12.13) 
1.89 
(14.23) 
1.65 
(12.17) 
% College Educated 5.19 
(4.05) 
7.94 
(6.28) 
5.04 
(3.92) 
% In Private Schools -4.11 
(-13.00 
-4.35 
(-14.05) 
-4.11 
(-12.98) 
% With School Age Children 4.97 
(15.22) 
3.78 
(11.78) 
4.82 
(14.74) 
Constant  2345.32 
(61.38) 
2840.18 
(45.43) 
2322.24 
(54.45) 
 
N=40,490 R2=0.60 R2=0.62 R2=0.60 
Note: The dependent variable is the state allocation to local school districts in each year.  The model employed a two-way 
fixed effect design with group effects for each state and each year.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
  
Figure 1. The Effect of Citizen and Institutional Liberalism on Revenue Equalization in Judicial 
Mandate versus Non-Judicial Mandate States 
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